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On 8 March 2021, the legal and political world was surprised by a judicial ruling of
Justice Fachin, from the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, which annulled three
criminal cases against the former President Lula da Silva in the context of the so-
called Operation Car Wash. Justice Fachin stroke down, among other charges,
Lula’s conviction for over 12 years of imprisonment for allegedly receiving a flat
in Guarujá beach, in the State of São Paulo, as a payback from contractors in
exchange for illegal contracts with Brazil’s national oil company (Petrobras). It was
only because of this conviction that Lula da Silva was arrested for 580 days and
became ineligible to run for the 2018 presidential elections, opening the way for
Bolsonaro’s victory. The main argument used by Justice Fachin in ruling the habeas
corpus writ was that Judge Sérgio Moro – the one who became Minister of Justice of
President Bolsonaro – had no jurisdiction over Lula’s cases, a viewpoint argued by
his attorneys a long ago.
On 9 March 2021, other Justices of the Federal Supreme Court started the trial of
other habeas corpus writs that went beyond the main legal argument of the ruling
of the previous day. They started debating the impartiality of former Judge Moro,
certainly a stronger hit against Operation Car Wash.
In the following, we aim to recover some of the main arguments, positions and
surrounding political scenario that involves Lula’s cases.
Operation Car Wash and Its Impacts
Prior to this recent decision, Lula’s liberty had been reestablished because the
Federal Supreme Court reformed its controversial case law that authorized, in
contradiction to the text of the 1988 Constitution, the detention of convicted persons
pending a final appeal. Nevertheless, an electoral statute and a ruling by the
Brazilian Superior Electoral Court prevented Lula da Silva from running for public
office or in any other way exercising his political rights until the end of his sentence –
in opposition to what the UN Human Rights Committee had indicated.
Although Lula’s conviction in the Operation Car Wash has met sharp criticism by
academics, international observers and practicing lawyers, Judge Moro received
enthusiastic support in the judicial branch, since Lula’s convictions have been
unanimously upheld on appeal by a federal court and the Superior Court of Justice.
The confirmation of Lula’s conviction seemed to take part in a broader “law and
order” movement lead by the Operation Car Wash. As the task force was widely
publicized with the help of traditional media outlets in reason of the huge amounts
of money involved in corruption and money laundry scandals that were directly or
indirectly connected to Petrobras, Brazilian public opinion was slowly mobilized to
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support the prosecutors and judges. Former Judge Moro himself confirmed that
he was mirroring the Italian Mani Pulite operation and that he should be backed by
popular support. For judges and prosecutors with conservative profiles, it became
easy to target specific political parties and politicians, support the wide judicialization
of mega-politics and accept occasional breaches of the rule of law. The operation
was recently terminated in the presidency of Bolsonaro, despite the political capital
that he inherited from the Operation Car Wash and the legal and political practices of
its key participants.
Nonetheless, there are still some influential justices in the Federal Supreme Court
who support the Operation Car Wash. Justice Fachin, for instance, recently declared
that the model propelled by the operation still stands, although the operation itself
has ended.
Strategic Behavior in the Federal Supreme Court
To see Lula’s condemnations being annulled without major damages to the
Operation Car Wash seemed to cohere with Justice Fachin’s previous interpretations
of the investigation scheme. Furthermore, that could be a way of the Federal
Supreme Court to show its teeth to the Armed Forces among the recent frictions
between both institutions, especially the confirmation of a pact to pressure the court
in 2018 to avoid changing the case law that authorized Lula’s imprisonment.
Furthermore, Justice Fachin’s ruling also demonstrates the state of affairs of a court
that has been praising individual decisions over institutional ones.
The scope of Fachin’s decision is wide, inasmuch as it declares as ultra vires all
of Judge Moro’s judicial acts against the defendant. Nonetheless, many of Lula’s
supporters hesitated to celebrate this victory, for it does not represent a guarantee
that the former mandatary will be eligible to run for the presidency in 2022. Justice
Fachin’s decision does not reach a verdict on Lula’s culpability; it settles only that
Judge Moro lacks competence to trial the cases, leaving it to a newly appointed first-
instance judge in Brasília (rather the local federal court in Curitiba) to reexamine the
evidence of the case and decide whether it can be employed as a ground for a new
judicial pronouncement. If the illegality of the evidence brought to the case by former
Judge Moro is not recognized, it remains possible that a new conviction is timely
upheld. If a second-instance verdict is reached before the elections of 2022, Lula da
Silva will become ineligible once again.
A decision redirecting the jurisdiction to a new judge would achieve three objectives
with a single move: first, it would preserve the procedural acts, such as hearings,
reports, experts opinions, and so on, which could be revalidated by the novel judge;
second, it would limit the effects of the decision to Lula’s cases, avoiding multiple
allegations of partiality of the trial judge; finally, and perhaps more importantly, it
would protect judicial authorities from public exposure and enhance the reputation of
impartiality of the judicial branch.
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The decision was criticized because the Federal Supreme Court failed to pronounce
the incompetence of Judge Moro in several opportunities, and there was little reason
to do it through a monocratic judicial settlement that arrived more than three years
later. But the biggest problem with the decision is that it made an impact in the
Court’s agenda and tried to prevent the Court from reaching a more comprehensive
ruling concerning the impartiality of Judge Moro himself. In this sense, and at least
for now, Justice Fachin’s strategy dominated the procedures.
A Normative Approach to Lula’s Cases
One of the central arguments of Lula da Silva’s defense is precisely that Moro lost
his impartiality on several occasions. Lula da Silva’s defense filed a writ of habeas
corpus whose judgment has been delayed for more than two years. Justice Fachin’s
monocratic decision was pronounced precisely when Justice Gilmar Mendes, who
retained the proceedings for detailed assessment of the files, announced that he
would bring back the case, allowing for a collegiate judgment of the court.
Given the seriousness of the accusations against Judge Moro, it was widely
expected that several vices in Lula’s trial would be recognized, with an even more
substantive defeat to the Operation Car Wash, inasmuch as Moro’s malpractices
spread over a vast number of cases. A formal recognition of judicial abuses could
lead both to an annulment of all the hearings and gathering of evidence in Lula’s
case,  and to a precedent that could quash several decisions pronounced by Moro
against other political actors.
In the day after Fachin’s decision, Justice Gilmar Mendes brought the case back to
Court, and purported to resume the trial of Moro’s partiality. Justice Fachin objected
on the grounds that this matter could no longer be trialed, since he annulled in the
previous criminal procedures that had been brought to court. His objection did not
succeed.
Justice Fachin’ strategy, however, was immediately perceived as ad hoc. The
problem is that (1) the trial on Moro’s partiality had already started, and (2) the
Code of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that allegations of partiality must be
resolved in advance of other defenses in the context of a criminal trial. The illegality
of Justice Fachin’s move was blatant, and the 2nd Panel of the Federal Supreme
Court promptly recognized it on 9 March 2021, in a four-to-one decision.
The judgment of Judge Moro’s impartiality resumed immediately after the dismissal
of Justice Fachin’s objection. In the previous session in which the court examined
the case, in 2019, two votes had been delivered, by Justice Fachin and Justice
Carmen Lúcia, who ruled in favor of Moro and denied the writ. But the new sitting of
the court pended in a different direction. The two votes recently delivered denounce,
in the words of Justice Mendes, the “biggest judicial scandal in Brazilian history”.
Justice Gilmar Mendes and Justice Ricardo Lewandowski presented ferocious
criticisms against former Judge Moro and the Car Wash team. The trial, however,
had to be suspended again because Justice Nuno Marques (indicated by President
Bolsonaro) requested access to the files because he has taken office recently. After
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this Justice’s request, the two Justices who had voted in the previous session of the
court – Justice Fachin and Justice Carmen Lúcia – informed the Chairman that as
soon as Justice Nunes Marques delivers his opinion they will deliver a restatement
of their votes. Two votes have been delivered to consider the former Judge Moro
a biased and political judge. In effect, Justice Gilmar Mendes referred to seven
facts that are indicative of judicial partiality: 1) the illegal seizure and relocation
of Lula da Silva, in order to coercively take him to a hearing in advance of any
formal communication and with massive media coverage that created a general
impression of guilt; 2) the arbitrary interception of telephone conversations between
Lula da Silva, his family members and, even the 25 counselors who have offices
in the firm that took over his defense; 3) the disclosure of a conversation between
Lula da Silva and former President Dilma Rousseff, which has been recorded
by Judge Moro and leaked to the press in the waking hours of an impeachment
process and with the intention to create social conditions favorable to the conviction
of Rousseff; 4) the off-duty engagement of former Judge Moro with informal acts
and ultra vires pronouncements to interfere in the Federal Police and avoid the
release of Lula da Silva in virtue of an habeas corpus writ granted by a federal judge
in July 2018; 5) the fact that Judge Moro’s sentence convicting Lula da Silva for
corruption was pronounced merely 2 minutes after the defense presented the final
allegations and made several comments that revealed an animosity between the
judge and the barristers responsible for the defense; 6) the fact that, “in the last
week before the first round of the elections”, and despite the lack of any request by
the prosecutor’s office, Judge  Moro disclosed to the public part of a draft of a plea
bargain agreement signed by Lula’s former Minister of Revenue, which purported
to interfere in the electoral process; and 7) the fact that shortly after convicting Lula
da Silva, the judge accepted a position of Minister of Justice under Jair Bolsonaro’s
presidency.
Recovering the Rule of Law?
Although these facts were proved in advance of the disclosure of the Intercept
Leaks, which exposed to the public Telegram messages between Judge Moro and
the prosecutors, it has recently become very difficult to sustain the convictions of
Lula da Silva. Former Judge Moro’s reputation seems to be irremediably stained,
and it is likely that Federal Supreme Court’s 2nd Panel will support Justice Gilmar
Mendes’s opinion that Lula’s trial was biased. According to Justice Gilmar Mendes,
the Operation Car Wash could be compared to the former URSS: “The narrow bond
between prosecutors and police officers allowed the Operation Car Wash to install a
truly Soviet system of monitoring strategies utilized by the defense of the claimant”.
The Federal Supreme Court seems to try to create a scenario for the reconstruction
of the rule of law, which has been severely impaired in the past five years. For a long
period of time, the judicial branch has been acting irresponsibly and incoherently
to achieve Rousseff’s impeachment, Lula da Silva’s arrest and removal from the
presidential run, and, last but not least, the ascension of Bolsonaro’s populist
rhetoric.
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